In a recent paper (Enns, 2004) , James Enns demonstrated nearly equivalent and strong backward-masking effects of various types of visual masks at longer target and mask temporal intervals (e.g., 150 ms), including strong masking with four dots considered to be a weak mask in standard masking conditions. The principal requirement for strong masking at long temporal intervals was that target had to be included among several other visual objects, which guaranteed that spatial attention was dispersed over an extended visual region in space. If time intervals were short (e.g., 50 ms), allowing integration of target and mask features, different masks had different effects. If attention was pre-focused on the spatial location of the target by precues, masking was negligible. James Enns (2004) claims that these findings pointed to a new understanding of masking based on the separate processes of object formation and object substitution. As a first item of my present reply, I will argue that the claim for novelty is clearly overstated.
In addition, Enns (2004) listed four features of masking as especially difficult to explain within standard theories of visual masking, the standard ones being (1) visual integration and perceptual confusion theories, (2) theories of processing interruption, (3) masking by competitive neural interaction. The four features difficult to explain by these theories being (i) no necessity of local contour interaction between target and mask for masking to occur, (ii) strong modulation of masking by a weak mask (e.g., four dots surrounding the target) by spatial attention, (iii) increase in the strength of masking with temporal extension of mask exposure beyond the offset of target, (iv) importance of the status of target and mask as individual objects for the expression of masking. James Enns claims that the only theory capable of explaining these features is the theory of substitution (Enns, 2004; DiLollo, Enns, & Rensink, 2000; Enns & DiLollo, 1997) . As a second item of my reply, I will argue that Enns (2004) has overlooked one theory that should be considered in explaining why the visual system has preference for the sensory input that arrives relatively late in time regardless of the type of mask and why backward masking is sensitive to attentional manipulations.
In Enns (2004 , Abstract, p. 1321 it is stated that ''Results . . . pointed to a new understanding of masking based on the separate processes of object formation and object substitution''. Also, his analysis ''. . . provides strong support for the idea, derived from the object substitution theory of masking (DiLollo et al., 2000) , that there are at least two distinct visual masking processes (Enns, 2004 (Enns, , p. 1328 )''. We are left with the view that this theoretical explanation is an invention from late 1990s and early 2000. Is it so?
Actually, already Turvey (1973) , DiLollo, Lowe, & Scott (1974) and Hogben & DiLollo (1974) have described a picture of internal visual processing similar to the one promoted recently by Enns and his associates. Thus, in Hogben & DiLollo (1974) the two stages were termed as synthesis of forms and segregation of forms (implicitly suggesting the possibility of between-object competition). In Bachmann & Allik (1976) , the formation stage followed by substitution stage was made more explicit. In that study, two spatially overlapping visual forms were presented with varying stimulus onset asynchronies. Subjects had to identify both forms. With very short SOAs both forms had approximately equal chance to be correctly perceived. At intermediate SOAs below 100 ms the first form perception dropped to a chance level while the second form dominated in explicit perception at a high level of identification rate. With long SOAs over 150 ms both forms were successfully identified. The identification function for the first form was U-shaped, reminiscent of typical metacontrast functions. If subjects attentively searched for the presence of pre-designated target objects within the pairs of forms, the U-shaped function for the first form disappeared and both forms were perceived at about equal level of correct responses. The theoretical explanation suggested in that article (Bachmann & Allik, 1976) was essentially the same as it would be in any theory proposing feature integration and object replacement as the two principal processes underlying masking in visual processing. To prove the point, let me quote (Bachmann & Allik, 1976, p. 92) : ''. . . divergent feature analysis is carried out by feature detectors . . . The stimulus is analysed with regard to its orientation, location, size, frequency, length, and the other characteristics, . . . . All these elements begin to integrate. . . . This triggers a concrete representation on the next, spatial objectsÕ, or iconic level. . . . Where the pre-iconic stage is preattentive, the post-iconic operations are focal.'' And continuing from the next page (Bachmann & Allik, 1976, p. 93) : ''Suppose now that two stimuli, S1 and S2 enter in rapid succession into this analysing system. . . . When the information on S2 reaches features level before the processing of S1 at this level is completed, then the features of both stimuli can be analysed in parallel. . . . As a consequence of this simultaneous integration of features, a common iconic representation is formed. If the construction of both stimuli or their energy ratio is such as to permit read-out from the integrated image, then both stimuli have high probabilities of being recognised. . . . When S1 is already represented at the iconic level, . . . it will be categorised or encoded. . . . When the features of S2 are integrated before the encoding of S1 is completed, then the succeeding item replaces the ÔoldÕ icon with the representation of a new object. . . ., the subject must at the first opportunity . . . name ÔtriangleÕ to the disc which he sees. But this inconsistent outcome is ruled out by the internal consistency of brain functioning . . . The subject is unable to pay conscious attention to two objects at once, although they are represented at different levels. On the neurophysiological plane this is possibly done . . . by distortion of intercortical excitatory feedback loops . . .'' In essence, this explanation suggests also a formation stage and a between-object competition stage that allows substitution of the initial object processing by the succeeding object processing. Thus what Enns terms as ''new'' maybe a rephrasing of the old.
My second item suggests that the theory of perceptual retouch (see Bachmann, 1984 Bachmann, , 1994 Breitmeyer & Ö gmen, 2000) should be also considered if we want to see whether object substitution theory (Enns, 2004; DiLollo et al., 2000; Enns & DiLollo, 1997) might be the only one capable of explaining the four features outlined in the beginning of the paper by Enns (2004) and capable of explaining his experimental results. Let me describe the foundations of the retouch theory before applying it for explaining backward masking and the four features of it claimed by Enns (2004) to be unexplainable by all other theories except substitution theory.
There is a widely accepted distinction between two brain systems: the sensory systems for stimulus-specific content and the systems for providing sufficient level (and frequency-pattern?) of cortical activation that is necessary for permitting a particular content to become explicitly represented (become conscious). The latter provides an enabling factor that is required for awareness, but does not directly contain specific contents of conscious experiences (Baars, 1995 (Baars, , 1997 Bachmann, 1984; Bogen, 1995; Llinás & Ribary, 2001; Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002) . The neurons of the content-specific system are termed ''drivers'' and the neurons of the conscious state systems belong to the class of ''modulators'' (Crick & Koch, 1998; Sherman & Guillery, 1998) . Drivers that have small receptive fields and that respond to spatially localised stimuli with very short delays are modulated by the facilitating input from the contentfree ''modulators'' of the so-called non-specific thalamus (Bachmann, 1984 (Bachmann, , 1994 Crick, 1984; Magoun, 1958; Purpura, 1970; Steriade, 1996a Steriade, , 1996b Steriade, Jones, & Llinás, 1990; Steriade, Jones, & McCormick, 1997) . Drivers encode specific stimulus features such as size, orientation, color, motion, etc. The thalamic structures termed ''non-specific'' (e.g., intralaminar nuclei, pulvinar, nucleus reticularis, etc.) do not participate directly in the operations of encoding of the contents of specific sensory information. Although their efferent pathways are projected presynaptically onto specific cortical driver-neurons. Non-specific units modulate the level of activity of the drivers, no matter what were the specific signals that evoked the activity within the specific system in the first place. Therefore the signal-to-noise ratio of the activity of cortical driver-units that signal the presence of some sensory feature (or combination of features) is altered. Mostly, this is done through the excitatory synapses and the effects include increase in the depolarization level of the specific neurons (i.e., level of excitatory post-synaptic potentials is augmented), increase in the firing frequency of the specific neurons and decrease in the latency with which these neurons begin to discharge. This permits sending their impulses to further levels of information processing in brain in a facilitated mode.
The processing of a newly appearing stimulus is thus serviced by two processes: (1) fast stimulus-specific responses by drivers and (2) a slower, spatially dispersed modulation via the collaterals through the non-specific thalamus. Since the latency of the cortical response to non-specific modulation is considerably slower compared to the afferent latency of the specific cortical neurons (measured in response to the actual stimulus input), the driver-neurons, initially activated only by the specific afference, have to wait for the arrival of the stimulus-related modulatory input. This secondary input has been shown to be necessary for explicit perception (awareness) of the stimulus information pertaining initially to preconscious specific representations (Baars, 1997; Bachmann, 1984 Bachmann, , 1994 ; LaBerge, 1997; Llinás & Ribary, 2001; Newman, 1995; Steriade et al., 1997) . Because receptive fields of the non-specific units are coarse, a spatially remote stimulus can affect facilitatory modulation of some other stimulusÕ specific processing; the respective specific units have different receptive fields in terms of the specific driver system afferent mappings however at the same time they share the receptive field of the same non-specific unit in thalamus.
In terms of the retouch theory (Bachmann, 1984 (Bachmann, , 1994 , the temporally delayed and spatially diffuse modulation from the modulators, targeted at the specific cortical neurons that carry preconscious information about the specific stimulation content serves to ''retouch'' that content for visual awareness (i.e., for explicit representation). Initially, at the onset of stimulation where there has not been any locally preceding visual input, the modulation through non-specific thalamus (or the change in the dynamic characteristics of this modulation such as resetting the phase of the oscillatory activity of neurons) takes considerable time to become effective. Consequently, the latency of sampling of the specific stimulus-signals for explicit representation is initially slow. The newly presented stimulus (e.g., S1 or a composite of target and mask that is switched off quickly) cannot be explicitly recognized very fast. The slow non-specific modulation that is necessary for explicit representation and that was evoked by the target (or target plus mask composite) arrives at cortical specific level of feature representation with a delay that is comparable to the values of the above-intermediate SOAs (about 50-150 ms). At the time when this modulation arrives cortex, the newly acquired specific signals of the mask information (i.e., the S2 specific signals that have the highest possible signal-to-noise ratio just at that moment) arrive or are continuously shipped through the fast specific channels and take advantage of the modulation that was preset by the preceding target (or by the target-mask composite in case of common onset, asynchronous offset displays). The mask dominates explicit representation because the specific signals of the preceding target are more decayed at this critical epoch of time while the specific signals of the mask are less decayed or even are continuously arriving to the specific feature processing sites in cortex as is the case with simultaneous onset, asynchronous offset of target and mask.
In this theory, like in the substitution theory, local contour interactions between target and mask are not required for masking to occur (feature [i] ). Because nonspecific modulation which is evoked by S1 and which is necessary for explicit perception is slow, it reaches cortex when mainly the specific signals from S2 drive cortical activity. Because receptive fields of non-specific modulators are large, spatially remote S1 and S2 can be interacting through non-specific facilitation. Therefore S2 dominates even when its contours are remote from the contours of S1. Because non-specific thalamic systems are related to attentional systems (Crick, 1984; LaBerge, 1995; Scheibel, 1981) and do not have unlimited capacity, the delay of effective non-specific modulation is longer with a larger number of stimuli in the display. The more there are stimulus objects, the more the S1 specific activity has been decayed at the moment when nonspecific modulation arrives. Thus backward masking gets stronger with more distributed attention (feature [ii] ). Moreover, perceptual retouch theory is explicit in predicting that if a spatial precue is presented before the target (i.e., before S1) to mark its location, the nonspecific modulation is prepared well ahead in time and therefore already S1 becomes well visible because nonspecific facilitatory effect from thalamus which is evoked by the precue arrives cortex right at the moment when S1 fast specific activity is maximised. Like in the substitution theory, in the retouch theory as well common onset and delayed asynchronous offset between target and mask are suitable conditions for mask contents to dominate in perception (feature [iii] ). This is because at the moment when delayed non-specific modulation arrives cortex, just the S2 specific signals have the highest signal-to-noise ratio there.
The experiments in Enns (2004) did not include manipulations that would allow to test the importance of perceptual objects in determining the outcomes of masking (feature [iv] ). Yet this feature can be incorporated into perceptual retouch theory because perception of objects assumes binding the features to form coherent perceptual entities (e.g., Cleeremans, 2003) . It is strongly hypothesised that gamma-frequency oscillations are an important mechanism of feature binding. At the same time it has been shown that one of the main effects of modulation from the non-specific thalamus in upgrading the activity of specific cortical driver neurons (e.g., pyramidal neurons in the middle layers of the visual cortex) up to the level which is necessary for explicating their contents for conscious perception consists in generating 40-Hz synchrony between the specific representational system activity and the non-specific intralaminar thalamic-system activity (Llinás & Ribary, 2001; Newman, 1995; Steriade et al., 1997) . The perceptual contents encoded by the 40-Hz oscillatory activity of the reentrant circuits involving specific cortical pyramidal neurons become explicated for awareness only when this activity becomes synchronized with another reentrant, 40-Hz activity taking place in the circuits involving intralaminar non-specific neurons (Llinás & Ribary, 2001 ). This kind of specific and non-specific synchronized activity is obtained by a well-described coincidence detection mechanism in local neural circuits. Since the non-specific counterpart of the synchronizing activity has long delay after a stimulus onset, formation of consciously perceived objects should be also delayed. The focus of explicit perceptual activity should be related to coherent wholistic objects as the main subject matter of the retouch process, but these objects appear in explicit perception only after the non-specific synchronization has been combined by the synchronization within the specific system.
There is one more feature in the interaction of rapidly successive visual objects (feature [v] that I would like to add to the initial list) that any masking theory that wants to be comprehensive should be able to explain: facilitation of the speed with which S2 becomes explicitly visible if presented after S1, compared to the conditions where S2 is presented alone (Bachmann, 1994; Scharlau & Neumann, 2003) . In the substitution theory, if the input activity (e.g., S1 preprocessing) is altered before the necessary iterations of reentrance are complete, a mismatch will be detected (between S1 and new S2 information) and the iterative processes will begin again, this time based only on the sensory input that is currently activating the lower-level neurons (i.e., S2). This predicts no temporal facilitation of S2 by S1 or predicts even slowing down of S2 processing if it is presented after S1, compared to when S2 is presented alone. If nothing else, then at least aborting the previous iterations and dealing with extra noise should take more time than effecting the ''clean'' and disturbance-free S2 processing if presented without S1. This can be termed temporal cost of reconfiguring, to use Vince DiLolloÕs term. Perceptual retouch theory, to the contrary, predicts temporal facilitation of S2 by S1, with S1 being able to predate non-specific facilitation for S2.
All in all, the claims by Enns (2004) that the twoprocess theory combining formation and substitution is new and that ''Prior to object substitution theory, there has been no reason to suspect that metacontrast masks, pattern masks and four dots are so closely related to one another in the way they interfere with target identification'' (Enns, 2004 (Enns, , p. 1329 are both misleading (see, e.g., Allik, 1976 and Bachmann, 1994 , for a similar theoretical description and for a theoretically different, however factually similar predictions, respectively). Most importantly, if masking refers to inaccessibility of the explicit, direct visibility related processes to the visual data processed in specific cortical modules then any theory of masking aspiring to be comprehensible should accommodate naturalscientific facts about the mechanisms that are necessary for explicit, conscious vision. The non-specific thalamic systems are known to bear that capacity. This is why the otherwise very plausible and well founded conceptualizations about the importance of top-down reentrance for individuation of the processed object-related information (e.g., Supèr, Spekreijse, & Lamme, 2001; DiLollo, Kawahara, Zuvic, & Visser, 2001; Lamme, 2003) should be complemented by the contributions from the mechanisms that create consciousness for vision in the first place. Or in the second place, if looked at from the perspective of processing time.
